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Recent Developments in State Income
Taxation of Unitary Business
By PRENTISS WILLSON, JR.
B.A., Occidental College, 1965; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1968; Partner,
Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco.
I. WORLDWIDE UNITARY COMBINATION UNDER SIEGE
Multinational taxpayers are challenging worldwide combi-
nations in a series of cases. Two of these cases, one arising from
California (Container Corporation of America)* and one arising
from Illinois (Chicago Bridge & Iron), are presently before the
United States Supreme Court. Three cases involving foreign par-
ent corporations which California has proposed combining with
the domestic (and foreign) subsidiaries are in lower federal courts
(Shell Petroleum, Alcan, and Capitol Industries-EMI). Others are
in the California courts (Firestone, Anaconda).
These cases are likely to be significantly affected by two deci-
sions (ASARCO and Woolworth, described infra) of the United
States Supreme Court last term. These cases held that nondomi-
ciliary states could not tax as business income an apportioned
share of dividends received by a domestic company from its for-
eign subsidiaries because the payor subsidiary was not unitary
with the parent. Thus the test for worldwide combination and the
test for inclusion of dividends as business income appear to be
very similar under the Supreme Court's analysis.
In addition to the fundamental issue of whether the busi-
nesses are "unitary," taxpayers are challenging worldwide combi-
nation on several other broad constitutional grounds:
A. under the foreign commerce clause, because it results in
double taxation;
B. under the foreign commerce clause, because it impairs the
* The seven cases mentioned in this paragraph are fully cited and discussed infra.
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ability of the federal government to "speak with one voice"
in the area of foreign affairs; and
C. under the due process clause, because the formula inevitably
leads to distortion (on its face or as applied to a particular
taxpayer).
I. BACKGROUND TO UNITARY ISSUE
A. Early Property and Capital Stock Tax Cases
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
Supreme Court considered a number of capital stock and prop-
erty tax cases applying formulary apportionment to railroads, tel-
egraph companies, and other businesses directly involved in
interstate commerce. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (189 1); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio Stale Au-
ditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897);American Express Co. v. Indiana, 165
U.S. 255 (1897); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904); Union Tank
Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919); Wallace v. Hines, 253
U.S. 66 (1920).
B. United States Supreme Court Cases
Beginning in the 1920's the Supreme Court considered a se-
ries of corporate income tax cases applying formulary apportion-
ment. Until ASA.RCO and Woolworth,* all demonstrated a close
economic relationship between operations in various states in-
cluding a flow of products. See Exxon Corp. v. Department of
Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315
U.S. 501 (1942); Hans Rees Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S.
123 (1931); Bass, Ratclff & Gretton, Ltd v. State Tax Commis-
sioner, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Cham-
berlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner
of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
C. State Courts Reach Different Results
Compare Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal.
2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947) (business unitary if operations within
* Fully cited infra.
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state dependent upon or contribute to the operations outside the
state), Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Department of Revenue, 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1451, 422 N.E. 1350 (1981); and Ward Paper Box
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 638 P.2d 1053 (1981), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 26 (1982) (the latter two cases involve diverse
lines of business with no product flow and only nominal central-
ized management and services - held unitary) with Common-
wealth v. ACF Industries, Inc., 441 Pa. 129, 271 A.2d 273 (1970)
andAshgrove Cement Co., 7 Or. T.R. 6 (1977).
Consider also two cases in which the California Supreme
Court rejected the argument (ironically by the Franchise Tax
Board) that a flow of goods was required in order to be unitary.
Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 406, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 545, 386 P.2d 33 (1963) and Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 417, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552, 386 P.2d 40 (1963).
D. Application of Unitary Principles to Conglomerates
Regulation 25120 of the California Administrative Code
(CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R.25120 (1973)) provides that con-
glomerates are unitary if there exists "strong centralized manage-
ment." Compare Appeal of Daniel Industries , [4 Cal.] St. Tax Rep.
(CCH) 206-393 (State Board of Equalization 1980) (business in-
volving manufacture and sale of sophisticated devices to meter
and control flow of liquid and gas not unitary with business of
manufacture and sale of alloy steel bolts and rivets), Appeal of
Holywood Film Enterprises, [4 Cal.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 206-
834 (State Board of Equalization 1982); with RJ Reynolds To-
bacco Company v. Department of Revenue [Department of Reve-
nue Decision No. 82-19 (Alaska, April 30, 1982)] (concluding
tobacco company not unitary with shipping company).
E. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions
1. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425
(1980) (nondomiciliary state could include dividends
from foreign subsidiaries in apportionable business in-
come based on assumption of Court that businesses were
unitary). States which rejoiced at this decision failed to
heed Court's warning that if "the business activities of the
19831
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dividend payor have nothing to do with the activities of
the recipient in the taxing State, due process considera-
tions might well preclude apportionability, because there
would be no underlying unitary business." Id at 442.
2. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207
(1980) (domestic business found to be single unitary busi-
ness, not the three separate businesses ((1) exploration
and production, (2) refining, and (3) marketing) for
which Exxon had argued).
III. THE SUPREME COURT NARROWS THE DEFINITION
OF UNITARY
A. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 102 S. Ct.
3103 (1982), rev'g 99 Idaho 924, 592 P.2d 39 (1979).
Background
1. General
ASARCO was engaged in the business of mining, smelt-
ing, refining, and selling metals. Its commercial domicile
was in New York and it conducted business in numerous
states including Idaho, where its principal business was min-
ing silver. Its smelting, refining, and other activities were
conducted outside of Idaho. During 1968-70, ASARCO re-
ceived sizeable dividends from General Cable, Revere Cop-
per & Brass, M.I.M. Holdings, ASARCO Mexicana, and
Southern Peru Copper. ASARCO also received interest on
Revere's convertible debentures, on a note received in con-
nection with a prior sale of Mexicana stock, and on a note
received in connection with the sale of General Cable stock.
In addition, it received capital gains on the sale of General
Cable stock as well as on the sale of its M.I.M. stock. The
issue was whether Idaho could tax a portion of the dividends,
interest, and capital gains as business income.
2. Subsidiaries paying dividends
a. General Cable and Revere were engaged in the metal
fabricating business which was a business not con-
ducted by ASARCO. ASARCO owned approxi-
mately 35% of the stock of each of these corporations
but had no representatives on the boards of directors,
(Vol, 6
Unitary Business Taxation
no common directors, and no common officers. In-
deed an antitrust decree prohibited ASARCO from
even voting its stock in these corporations. There
were substantial intercompany transfers at competi-
tive prices.
b. M.I.M. was engaged in mining, milling, smelting, and
refining in Australia and England. ASARCO owned
approximately 53% of M.I.M.'s stock, with the bal-
ance of the stock widely held. ASARCO had no rep-
resentatives on the board of directors, no common
directors, and no common officers. There were no
significant business transactions between the two
corporations.
c. ASARCO owned 49% of the stock of Mexicana. Mex-
ican law prohibited ownership of any greater percent-
age. ASARCO did not control Mexicana or dictate its
policies. There were no common officers. Both were
in the same general line of business but only nominal
intercompany sales were made from Mexicana.
ASARCO also performed miscellaneous services for
Mexicana and was compensated on an arm's-length
basis.
d. ASARCO owned 51.5% of Southern Peru but pursu-
ant to the terms of an agreement with the other share-
holders of Southern Peru, ASARCO could not
exercise control of the corporation. Under this agree-
ment, which was incorporated into Southern Peru's
bylaws, ASARCO could appoint only six of the thir-
teen directors. Approximately 35% of the copper pro-
duced by Southern Peru was sold to ASARCO, all at
arm's-length prices. ASARCO provided certain inci-
dental technical services for which it received a fee.
3. Treatment of the income
ASARCO treated the dividend income from these sub-
sidiaries as nonbusiness income not subject to apportionment
in Idaho. Idaho determined that these amounts were appor-
tionable business income increasing taxable income from
$400,000 to $2,300,000 in one year and from $128,000 to
$2,200,000 in another. The initial decision of the Idaho
Supreme Court in favor of the state was in March 1979 (99
19831
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Idaho 924, 592 P.2d 389). The United States Supreme Court
vacated that decision and remanded the case "for reconsider-
ation in light of' Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425 (1980), ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3108. On re-
mand, the Idaho Supreme Court issued a one paragraphper
curiam decision, reinstating its prior opinion. 102 Idaho 38,
624 P.2d 946 (1981).
B. F W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department,
102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982), revs' 95 N.M. 519, 624 P.2d 28 (1981).
1. Background
Woolworth and its foreign subsidiaries were engaged in
the same general line of business. The operations of the sub-
sidiaries were highly decentralized. There was no flow of
goods. The management of the foreign subsidiaries had
complete control over business decisions.
2. Issue
The issue was the same as in ASARCO, namely can a
.state (New Mexico) constitutionally tax dividends from these
foreign subsidiaries as business income?
C. Holdings
The Supreme Court held Idaho and New Mexico could not
tax the dividends as business income.
1. The Court reiterated that the "linchpin of apportion-
ability for state income taxation of an interstate enter-
prise is the unitary business principle." 102 S. Ct. at 3134
(quoting Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S.
207, 223 (1980) in turn quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980)).
2. In Mobil and Exxon "the states prevailed because it was
clear that the corporations operated unitary businesses
with a continuous flow and interchange of common prod-
ucts." ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3116, n.24. Exxon was a
domestic combination case where Exxon sought to sepa-
rately account for its income in Wisconsin. The Court
found that Exxon constituted a simple unitary business
[Vol, 6
Unitary Business Taxation
because it was a "highly integrated business which bene-
fits from an umbrella of centralized management and
controlled interaction." Exxon, 447 U.S. at 224.
3. By contrast, in ASARCO and Woolworth the Court
found on the facts that there was no functional integra-
tion and no substantial operational interdependence.
4. Several of the key observations of the Court should affect
the scope of the factual inquiry of state revenue agents:
a. "Except for the type of occasional oversight - with
respect to capital structure, major debt, and dividends
- that any parent gives to an investment in a subsidi-
ary, there is little or no integration of the business ac-
tivities or centralization of the management of [the
corporations involved]." Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at
3138.
b. The Court made clear that thepotential ability to op-
erate a company as part of a unitary business is not
dispositive, but that the companies must be operated
as an integrated enterprise. Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at
3135; ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3114-15. This should
seriously undercut the heavy reliance California tra-
ditionally places on its administrative regulations
which set out an administrati'epresunption of unitary
business in the event of either a vertical enterprise or
operations in the same line of business. Title 18, Cali-
fornia Administrative Code, Register 25120. To the
extent such a presumption is based on the notion that
such enterprises have a highpotential for the requisite
integration, it is clear that actual substantial opera-
tional interdependence is necessary.
c. Observation: It is probable that the standards set out
by the Supreme Court will lead to a somewhat anom-
alous result in audits: audits regarding proposed com-
bination of a parent and subsidiaries would seem to
need more focus on real operational ties, not the triv-
ial connections on which California often constructs a
unitary case and which are so time consuming to an-
swer the multitude of questions proposed. On the
other hand, the Multistate Tax Commission has sug-
gested that in audits relating to taxation of dividends
as business or nonbusiness income, much greater in-
19831
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formation will be necessary since a nondomiciliary
state can reach only dividends from a functionally in-
tegrated subsidiary.
IV. Caterpillar Tractor Co. P. Lenckos, 84 Ill. 2d 102, 417 N.E.2d 1343
(198 1),prob. juris noted sub. nom. Chicago Bridge & Iron v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 102 S. Ct. 564 (1982), oral argument April 19,
1982, reargument ordered May 3, 1982, 102 S. Ct. 2032 (1982).
A. Background
1. Case arose when Caterpillar filed claims for refund of ap-
proximately $8 million for 1969-1974. No dispute exists
but that the Caterpillar parent and approximately
twenty-one subsidiaries are operating a single unitary
business.
2. Despite a prior ruling that combined reporting was not
authorized (Illinois Income Tax Information Bulletin
[1975-1 Ill.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 11,541), the Illinois
Department of Revenue agreed with Caterpillar that a
single unitary business was being conducted. Caterpillar
sought judicial review of a decision that it was unitary for
1969 and the denial of certain deductions.
3. Meanwhile, Chicago Bridge & Iron (CBI) filed its tax re-
turns using the separate, arm's-length method and Illinois
asserted that worldwide combination was necessary.
4. CBI and numerous corporations then intervened in the
Caterpillar litigation.
B. Present status
1. In the Illinois Supreme Court, Caterpillar and the Illinois
Department of Revenue prevailed. 84 Ill. 2d 102, 417
N.E.2d 1343 (1981).
2. On April 19, 1982, the case was argued to the Supreme
Court (Justice Stevens was not present); on May 3, 1982,
the case was reset for oral argument next term (no date
was ordered). 102 S. Ct. 2032. In 1983 the Supreme
Court dismissed the case for want of a substantial federal
question. 103 U.S. 3563.
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V. Container Corp. ofAmerica v. Franchise Tax Board, 117 Cal. App.
3d 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1981),prob.juris. noted 102 S. Ct. 2034
(1982) (oral argument heard January 10, 1983).
A. Background of the case
1. Action for refund of California franchise taxes brought
by Container Corporation of America (CCA) against the
Franchise Tax Board. The case involves two important
issues relating to the application of the California unitary
doctrine in state taxation of corporations:
a. Whether on the facts of the case the parent and sub-
sidiaries are involved in a unitary business within the
California statutes and court decisions.
b. Whether the unitary doctrine may be applied on a
worldwide basis to a United States parent and its
subsidiaries.
2. On October 19, 1979, the California Superior Court en-
tered judgment in favor of the Board. The decision was
affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, First Appel-
late District, April 14, 1981, 117 Cal. App. 3d 998, 173
Cal. Rptr. 121. The California Supreme Court declined
to review the case. The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. 51 U.S.L.W.
4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983).
3. Our law firm, Morrison & Foerster, is counsel for CCA in
the litigation. Understandably, this presentation views
the case from CCA's position.
B. Facts of the case
1. The case involves the years 1963-65. CCA is headquar-
tered in Chicago, Illinois, and owns a controlling interest
in twenty subsidiaries organized and operating in foreign
countries. CCA's operations are solely within the United
States and involve the manufacture and sale of boxes and
cartons. CCA makes a few sales outside the United
States but the subsidiaries are not involved. CCA's prod-
ucts include both plain brown boxes and specially
designed consumer-oriented cartons. The subsidiaries
are in the same general business as the parent.
1983]
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2. Operating subsidiaries are located in Colombia, Vene-
zuela, Mexico, Germany, Holland, and Italy.
3. The subsidiaries in each country are self-sufficient. In
some countries the subsidiaries buy their own raw mater-
ials, manufacture pulp, produce the boxes and cartons,
and sell in the local countries. In other countries the sub-
sidiaries do not manufacture pulp but buy the materials
for producing boxes and cartons from independent
sources. There is almost no transfer of raw materials or
finished products from the parent to the subsidiaries.
There are no transfers of raw material or finished prod-
ucts from the subsidiaries to the parent. There is little
transfer of technology or know-how from CCA to the
subsidiaries (the information is readily available other-
wise) nor is there much help from CCA in marketing and
sales (because of differences in products and customer
needs). CCA provides management services at the policy
level in regard to approval of capital additions. The daily
operations of the subsidiaries are left to local manage-
ment. There is little in the way of centralized services by
the parent. The parent provides about 40% of the financ-
ing for the subsidiaries; 60% is obtained in the local coun-
try. There is not much transfer of personnel from the
parent to the subsidiaries or vice versa. During the years
in suit twenty-six employees of the subsidiaries were for-
merly employees of CCA. There are a total of 6800 em-
ployees in the subsidiaries. Practically all of the top
officers of the subsidiaries were local, and in nearly half
of the subsidiaries a majority of the Board of Directors
was local. In a number of instances CCA acted as a bro-
ker in finding machinery (principally used machinery) for
the Latin American subsidiaries.
C. Summary of the arguments
1. CCA's position is that CCA and the foreign subsidiaries
are not unitary.
a. Basic California cases such as Butler Brothers v. Mc-
Colgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), af'd,
315 U.S. 501 (1942); Edison California Stores, Inc. v.
McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947), in-
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volved a transfer of products. In fact, all of the re-
ported decisions on the unitary doctrine through
Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 7
Cal. App. 3d 99, 86 Cal. Rptr. 350, modfled, 10 Cal.
App. 3d 496, 87 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1970), appeal dis-
missed and cert. denied, 400 U.S. 961 (1971), have in-
volved a fact situation in which there is a substantial
flow of products, either from a manufacturing parent
to a sales subsidiary or division, or from a central
purchasing division to a sales subsidiary or division.
The only exceptions are the Court of Appeal decision
in this case and the California Supreme Court deci-
sions in Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board,
60 Cal. 2d 417, 386 P.2d 40, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1963),
and Superior Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 60
Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 33, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1963). In
the latter two cases, the Supreme Court was struck by
the unfair result of separate accounting. These cases
involved producing oil companies with very extensive
central operations, management, and services flowing
into all states in which the companies had operations.
If the separate businesses are in fact closely inte-
grated, then combined reporting and apportionment
by formula is reasonable within the domestic United
States. The decisions do not, however, support a
holding that CCA and its subsidiaries are unitary.
b. ASARCO and Woolworth strongly support CCA's
position that the requisite operational and functional
interdependence are not present.
2. Combined reporting impairs federal uniformity in an
area where federal uniformity is essential.
a. Worldwide combined reporting prevents the Federal
Government from "speaking with one voice" when
regulating commercial relations with foreign govern-
ments; as a result it violates the foreign commerce
clause. In Japan Line, Ltd v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 448-49 (1979) the Court said the follow-
ing: "[A] state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign
commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential. Foreign com-
merce is preeminently a matter of national concern."
1983]
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Id at 448. The Court spoke of the Framers' overrid-
ing concern that "the Federal Government must
speak with one voice when regulating commercial re-
lations with foreign governments." Id at 449.
b. Disputes may arise in attempts to reconcile the com-
peting claims of various jurisdictions to impose taxes
which only the Federal Government has the authority
to resolve with respect to foreign nations.
c. If a state tax creates an asymmetry in the international
tax structure, foreign nations disadvantaged by a state
tax levy may retaliate against American-owned in-
strumentalities in their jurisdictions.
d. The Federal Government has spoken. All United
States tax treaties (except with the Soviet Union), the
United States "model" Income Tax Treaty, and nu-
merous others adopt the arm's-length method as be-
tween corporations operating in the United States and
related entities operating in foreign countries.
e. The states' response to the "one-voice" argument has
been that there is no uniform federal policy created by
Congress which precludes use of formula apportion-
ment of unitary business income for state income tax-
ation as is demonstrated by the rejection in Congress
of Article IX(4) of the proposed United States-United
Kingdom tax treaty. 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 8103
I (Mar. 25, 1980) and by the rejection in Congress
year after year of bills introduced which would, if
passed, restrict the ability of states to require world-
wide combination.
3. Worldwide combined reporting creates a substantial risk
of multiple taxation.
a. The international situation differs from that presented
in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267
(1978), where the Court upheld an Iowa single factor
formula. The Court expressed a clear tolerance of the
imperfections in varying apportionment methods
when commerce within the United States is involved.
b. In Japan Lines, the Court indicated: "When a State
seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce, two additional considerations . . . come into
play. The first is the enhanced risk of multiple taxa-
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tion. . the basis for this Court's approval of appor-
tioned property taxation. . . has been its ability to
enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing
bodies." 441 U.S. at 446-47. "Yet neither this Court
nor this Nation can ensure full apportionment when
one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign." Id
at 447.
c. The parties dispute whether or not double taxation ac-
tually results or is impermissible if it does.
1) Former Secretary of the Treasury William Simon
commented as follows:
The unitary system contains the implicit as-
sumption that profit rates in different units of
a corporate family, engaged in different activ-
ities or in different locations are always the
same. This is clearly not the case. Thus, to
the extent profit rates differ, the unitary sys-
tem misallocates income. Whenever profit
rates are higher in foreign affiliates than in
domestic activities, the unitary system does
have the effect of taxing foreign corporations.
2) Former Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal
summarized the same concerns in a letter to the
California Franchise Tax Board:
Though you state that unitary apportionment
is 'the most accurate and reasonable method
yet devised' for assessing the income of one
element in a multi-national group, it is our
experience, as well as that of most other
countries, that the determination of income
on the basis of an arm's-length standard is
not only more accurate but also far less arbi-
trary. The arm's-length standard is the inter-
nationally accepted approach. Thus, in an
international context, the use of another
method by one jurisdiction will often lead to
double taxation.
Letter from W. Michael Blumenthal to Martin
Huff, Executive Officer of the Franchise Tax
Board (Feb. 15, 1977) (reprinted in Appendix to
Brief for the International Bankers Association in
California, Akai Electric Co., Ltd., as ,4mici Cu-
1983]
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riae in support of Appellant. Chicago Bridge d
Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-349,
Jan. 8, 1982.).
3) Treasury Tax Reform Option Paper No. VIII,
dealing with international taxation, discussed a
proposal to require states to use arm's-length re-
porting rather than worldwide combined report-
ing and set forth the following reasons, among
others, for and against this proposal:
Pro. The arm's-length standard under which
corporations apply to interfirm transactions,
those prices which would have been used by
an independent buyer and seller, has become
the international method of allocating income
between countries. When one country or the
states within that country apply an unconven-
tional rule, international double taxation of
income results. As state income tax rates
have increased, this double taxation has be-
come more onerous.
Con. State tax administrators believe that the
unitary method yields higher state tax reve-
nues (this advantage being the other side of
the double taxation coin), and as a result vig-
orously oppose federal restrictions on their
practices.
d. The California position, as stated in its amicus brief
in the Chicago Bridge & Iron case, disputes the double
taxation argument:
1) Multiple taxation by different governmental levels
is permitted since the identical income may be,
and normally is, taxed at least twice, once by the
United States and once by Illinois. The State,
then, asserts that "no authority or reasoning sug-
gests that the rules should differ just because the
national level tax is imposed by some other coun-
try." Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellee at 18,
Chicago Bride & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 102 S. Ct. 2032 (1982).
2) California also argues that all double taxation is
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eliminated by the federal tax credit provisions.
Id at 17.
3) California also cited a Harvard Law Review
Note, Multinational Corporations and Income 41lo-
cation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1202 (1976) in asserting
that unitary apportionment is allowed by the IRS
in actual application of I.R.C. § 482 and the regu-
lations under section 863, all in an effort to show
that worldwide combined reporting is not in con-
ffict with federal policy. Id at 33-34.
4. Extending the unitary doctrine to include corporations
operating in foreign countries raises serious problems of
distortion and administration.
a. Extending the unitary doctrine to include foreign cor-
porations causes serious problems of distortion and
administration to arise that are not present when it is
limited to domestic corporations.
b. In regard to distortion, the unitary system assumes
that all units of the combined group are operating in a
common market with a common economic and polit-
ical system. The underlying assumption is that a dol-
lar of property, payroll, and sales will earn about the
same amount of net income anywhere within the geo-
graphic area to which the system applies. This is ba-
sically true within the United States; it is not true on a
worldwide basis for the following reasons:
1) As a general matter, foreign subsidiaries of
United States corporations are more profitable
than the parent. The unitary doctrine will inevi-
tably attribute some part of the net income of the
subsidiaries to the United States. The expert testi-
mony in the CCA case showed:
i) Multinational companies utilize different
"hurdle rates" in different parts of the world
which set a minimum anticipated rate of re-
turn. If it is not met, the investment will not
be made.
ii) These hurdle rates vary from company to
company, industry to industry, and country
to country. An individual United States
19831
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company will invariably have a higher hurdle
rate for a foreign investment than for a simi-
lar domestic investment, however. Thus,
United States companies expect to receive a
greater rate of return on a foreign investment
than on a similar domestic investment. Fur-
thermore, United States companies have a
single hurdle rate for similar United States
investments.
iii) The expectation of a greater rate of return on
foreign investments is actually achieved.
iv) These greater profits are achieved for several
reasons including lower labor costs, more
rapidly expanding economies, greater market
share, governmental protection from compe-
tition, and so forth.
2) The evidence demonstrates that CCA's foreign
subsidiaries in Latin America and Holland were
more profitable than its United States operations.
The following table compares the income attribu-
table to the various countries under a separate ac-
counting analysis with that assigned to the
countries under California's unitary system.
Average Pre-Tax Income
per Separate Accounting Average Pre-Tax Income











Total Overseas 13,588 9,642




The above data demonstrate that the distortion pro-
duced by the formula is particularly acute as between
the underdeveloped and the highly industrialized
countries. (Note that the apportionment formula at-
tributes approximately one-half of the income pro-
duced in Colombia and Venezuela according to
separate accounting principles to other countries.) In
Colombia's case, less income is apportioned to Co-
lombia than the Colombian subsidiaries paid in taxes.
The United States, on the other hand, is the principal
beneficiary of this reassignment of income.
3) The evidence also demonstrates substantial differ-
ences in the factors as between CCA and the for-
eign subsidiaries and their relationship to net
income, particularly in regard to payroll. The
data are summarized in the following tables
which compare the relationship between dollars
of sales, of payroll, and of property required to
produce $1.00 of net income computed for CCA
domestically and for CCA's foreign subsidiaries
as a whole.
Amount Required to Produce $1.00 of Net
Income for the Years in Issue
Payroll Sales Property
Domestic: $3.17 $9.82 $4.15
1963
Foreign: 1.19 7.73 5.45
Domestic: 2.92 9.27 4.15
1964
Foreign: 1.02 6.88 4.50
Domestic 2.99 9.88 4.85
1965
Foreign 0.97 6.52 4.18
As can be seen from this table, the distortion in
the apportionment of CCA's income can be traced
primarily to a dramatic difference in the relation-
ship of payroll cost to net income in the United
States as compared to other countries, and to a
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lesser extent to a difference in the relationship of
sales to net income.
The lower cost of labor in foreign countries where
CCA maintains subsidiaries is not offset by differ-
ences in productivity. The following table shows
the direct labor cost for workers in plants that
convert paperboard into corrugated shipping con-
tainers in Colombia and California. These figures
indicate the average wage of workers in a corru-
gated plant in Colombia and California and the
number of work-hours necessary to produce one
thousand square feet (MSF) of corrugated con-
tainers in each of the plants. The table also indi-
cates the labor cost per MSF for each plant.
Analysis of Hourly Labor Costs*
for Corrugated Plants
California
Corona, Oakland, Fresno, Malt. Ave, Weighted
CA CA CA CA Average Colombia
Workhours per MSF .41 .39 .33 .33 .J9 .98
Labor Cost per workhour 6.48 7.83 6.71 7.90 7.41 1,21
Labor Cost per MSF 2.64 3.09 2.20 2.64 2.85 1.19
4) Exchange rate fluctuations also may cause distor-
tions. Depending upon the relationship of foreign
currency to the dollar in any particular year, a
foreign subsidiary may have a profit or loss based
solely on currency fluctuations. Serious problems
may also arise in regard to determining the value
of current assets as well as other problems.
5) The Franchise Tax Board has protested that a
taxpayer cannot contest the use of the unitary ap-
proach by using separate accounting data. Moor-
man Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267
(1978), affirms the use of separate accounting
analysis. See supra section I.C.3.
c. Extending the unitary doctrine to foreign corporations
also raises serious administrative problems for taxpay-
ers and the Board. Thus, foreign corporations are or
should be required to restate their net incomes in ac-
cordance with the California franchise tax law. Fur-
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ther, serious questions arise in regard to the ability of
the Board to audit combined reports which include
foreign corporations.
d. CCA's position is that the unitary doctrine cannot be
applied on a worldwide basis because of the distor-
tions inherent in such application. California court
decisions upholding the unitary doctrine have all
been based upon the application of the doctrine to the
common market established within the domestic
United States. The decisions have not dealt with the
different conditions which obtain as between the
United States and other countries of the world, partic-
ularly the so-called underdeveloped countries. This
leads to inevitable distortions. These differences in
economic conditions are more or less permanent in
nature, or will at least run for a long time. Thus, con-
ditions as between the United States and foreign
countries must be distinguished from differences in
economic conditions within the United States where,
for example, lower wages in one area will induce
business to move to that area causing such wages to
rise over a period of time. The same freedom of
movement is not present in the international sphere.
Thus, such cases as John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise
Tax Board, 38 Cal. 2d 214, 238 P.2d 569 (1961) which
upheld the unitary doctrine in spite of differences in
economic return within the United States are
distinguishable.
It should be noted that in Chase Brass, the court up-
held the.exclusion from the unitary group of a subsid-
iary operating in Chile but did not provide its
reasoning on the matter. However, in Anaconda v.
Franchise Tax Board, 130 Cal. App. 3d 15, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 640 (1982), discussed infra, the Court of Appeal
upheld the inclusion of a Chilean mining subsidiary.
VI. OTHER PENDING CASES
A. Shell Petroleum N. V P. Grapes, No. C81 4302 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 4, 1982).
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1. Background and Facts
Shell Petroleum N.V. (SPNV), a company based in the
Netherlands, has brought suit in Federal District Court to
restrain the California Franchise Tax Board from issuing
franchise tax assessments against two domestic companies,
Shell Oil Company and Scallop Nuclear. The FTB has pro-
posed assessments against Shell which treat the company as
part of a worldwide unitary business. It has also indicated
that the tax assessments may be issued against Scallop on the
same basis. SPNV contends that such assessments would vi-
olate treaty provisions between the United States and the
Netherlands (especially the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, 8
U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 4024) and the United States
Constitution.
2. Decision
On August 4, 1982, the District Court decided against
Shell, concluding that SPNV, as a mere shareholder of Shell
Oil Company and Scallop Nuclear, lacked "standing to sue."
As an independent ground for deciding against SPNV, the
court concluded that the time was not "ripe" for such a law-
suit because contingent events might intervene which would
eliminate the anticipated problem since there are no Notices
of Proposed Assessment as yet issued against Shell or Scallop
Nuclear and no final administrative action has been taken.
The court continued as follows:
During the hearing and appeal process, the Franchise
Tax Board and Board of Equalization would presumably
be applying the Bank and Corporation Tax Law with the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Asarco Inc. v. Idaho
State Tax Commission, 50 U.S.L.W. 4962 (U.S. June 29,
1982) [102 S. Ct. 3103] and F.. Woolworth Co. v Taxa-
tion and Revenue Department, 50 U.S.L.W. 4957 (U.S.
June 29, 1982) [102 S. Ct. 3218] in mind. These cases,
decided while these motions were under submission, re-
versed state supreme court decisions that had upheld tax-
ation of formula-apportioned income received from
foreign subsidiaries of the taxpayers. They clarify the
definition of 'unitary business' which can pass muster
under the due process clause. Just how the Board will
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apply the Bank and Corporation Tax Law now remains
to be seen.
Memorandum Decision and Order, Shell Petroleum, at 13.
The Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit affirmed the de-
cision of the lower court. Shell Petroleum, N. V. . Franchise
Tax Board, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983).
B. Capitol Industries-EMI, Inc. v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107 (9th
Cir. 1982).
EMI, a United Kingdom corporation which is the parent of
Capitol Industries, brought suit for injunctive and declara-
tory relief to prevent the FTB from assessing additional in-
come against Capitol Industries, which operates in California
on a worldwide combination basis, including the income and
factors of EMI. The Ninth Circuit held on February 16,
1982, that EMI did not have an adequate state remedy and
thus the Federal District Court had jurisdiction over the EMI
claims. The case was remanded back to the Federal District
Court. However, the Ninth Circuit did not decide the stand-
ing issue discussed above but expressed serious reservations
about the parent's standing to sue. On remand the District
Court decided against EMI on the standing issue and EMI
has appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In the companion case
involving EMI's subsidiary, Capitol Industries, the Court
held that Capitol could not sue in the Federal District Court
because California tax procedures provided for a plain, ade-
quate, and speedy remedy for a taxpayer doing business
there. Capitol's petition for certiorari has been denied. 103
S. Ct. 570 (1982).
C. Alcan Aluminium Ltd v. Franchise Tax Board, No. 81 Civ
3911 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1982).
This case is another foreign parent, worldwide unitary case
brought in federal court. The court concluded that the Anti-
Injunction Act did not bar the taxpayer's suit because it did
not have a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" in the Cali-
fornia courts. The court also held the eleventh amendment
to the United States Constitution (which protects states from
being sued in federal court without their consent) did not bar
the suit because the eleventh amendment does not apply to
federal court actions against state officials to enjoin them
from enforcing unconstitutional statutes. However, the court
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stayed the action pending a disposition of the issues concern-
ing the FTB's worldwide unitary approach in state court or
in the United States Supreme Court (citing the Container
case).
D. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Franchise Tax Board.
1. Background
The FTB combined Firestone on a worldwide basis for
the years 1960 through 1963. The trial court determined that
thirteen of Firestone's foreign manufacturing subsidiaries
were not engaged in a unitary business with Firestone. The
trial court determined that nine remaining foreign subsidiar-
ies were unitary with Firestone and that there were no con-
stitutional impediments to worldwide combined reporting
and that generally no adjustments to the factors were
required.
Firestone appealed from those portions of the judgment
determining that the nine foreign companies were engaged
in a unitary business with Firestone, that worldwide com-
bined reporting is constitutionally permissible, and that
worldwide formulary apportionment as applied to the facts
of this case properly reflects California's taxable income.
The FTB cross-appealed from that portion of the judgment
which determined that thirteen of the foreign companies
were not engaged in a unitary business with Firestone.
2. Statement of Facts
Firestone was engaged in the manufacture, distribution,
and sale throughout the United States of tires, tubes, and re-
lated products. Firestone concedes that an apportionable
part of that income from those operations is properly subject
to tax by California.
Firestone also owned a majority of the equity common
stock of various domestic (incorporated in the United States
but not in California) and foreign (incorporated outside the
United States) corporations.
3. Status of the Case
The case is presently in the California Court of Appeal,
Second Appellate District, Division Four, 2nd Civil No.
62918.
E. Anaconda Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 130 Cal. App. 3d 15,
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181 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982), appeal docketed (U.S. Aug. 20,
1982).
1. Background
The issue was similar to one raised in the Chase Brass
case, specifically, whether Anaconda was engaged in a uni-
tary business with its Chilean and Mexican subsidiaries. The
trial court found for Anaconda resulting in a refund in excess
of $3 million for income years 1956-1958. The Court of Ap-
peal (First Appellate District, Division Four), issued its sec-
ond opinion on March 24, 1982, reversing the trial court.
The court held that the FTB had properly treated the corpo-
ration as engaged in a unitary business with its foreign
subsidiaries.
Anaconda, as the nation's second largest copper pro-
ducer, was principally engaged in producing copper within
the continental United States. It owned and operated two
major copper mines in the United States.
Anaconda had three affiliates doing business in Chile
and engaged in mining and processing copper and metal by-
products. During the years involved there was very substan-
tial intervention in the basic operations of the Chilean sub-
sidiaries by the government of Chile.
2. Decision of Court of Appeal
Anaconda challenged unity of ownership on the ground
that the pervasive intervention in the subsidiary's operations
undermined the parent corporation's nominal ownership and
control. The court acknowledged the government regulation
and intervention but held that it did not upset the unity of
ownership.
With regard to unity of operation, the court relied on
intercompany copper sales between the Chilean companies
and Anaconda's domestic unitary operation as well as some
assistance in purchasing rendered by the parent plus "peri-
odic internal audits of Latin American company records [by
the parent]" and the providing by the parent of "statistical
material" for the Latin American companies. 130 Cal. App.
3d at 26. The court also relied on substantial intercompany
loans and the guaranty of a number of loans obtained by the
foreign subsidiaries. In addition, the court looked to certain
high level hiring decisions which had to be approved by Ana-
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conda's executive committee, some limited transfers of em-
ployees to the foreign subsidiaries who were allowed to
continue their domestic employee benefits, and certain em-
ployees' participation in a stock option plan of the parent, as
well as the providing of certain administrative services. All
of these the court found to be "overwhelming" indications of
unity of operation. Id
The unity of use the court found as a result of the over-
lap of the Board of Directors was that many Anaconda of-
ficers were key officers of the foreign subsidiaries, that the
Board of Directors of the parent was "advised of Latin
American operating conditions," and the submitting of
financial reports from the subsidiary to the parent corpora-
tion- Id at 27.
The court found itself needing to distinguish Chase
Brass where the Court of Appeal excluded from the unitary
group Braden Copper Corporation (a subsidiary of Kenne-
cott Copper Corporation) which along with two of Ana-
conda's subsidiaries doing business in Chile were the three
largest Chilean producers of copper. The court distinguished
the two by finding that, in the Chase Brass case, Braden was
a copper producer and Chase was a manufacturer. The court
then quoted the Chase Brass court to the effect that functions
of a vertically integrated enterprise are not so markedly uni-
tary as they are in a horizontally integrated business. Thus,
the court said that since Braden and Chase were involved in
different aspects of the copper business they would be consid-
ered vertically integrated and thus less likely to be unitary.
That was distinguishable, the court thought, because Ana-
conda and the Latin American subsidiaries were involved in
the mining aspect of the copper business. It also found addi-
tional ties between Anaconda and its Chilean operations over
and above those which existed between Chase and Braden
including, extensive operational ties in areas such as purchas-
ing, personnel, accounting, loans, and engineering services as
well as the integration of major executive functions "such as
overlap on the Boards of Directors and in the key officer po-
sitions of the companies." Id at 29.
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